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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Honorable Timothy Hansen in the District
Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Ada, dated the
5th of November, 2014. in which Appellant was convicted of Trafficking in Marijuana, a violation
of Idaho Code§ 37-2732(B)(a)(4).

B. Course of the Proceedings Below
An Information was filed with Ada County Court on June 13 1\ 2013, charging the
Defendant with a violation of I.C Section 37-2732(B)(a)(c), Trafficking in Marijuana. R., pp.
16/218. On June 28°1, 2013, the Defendant entered a plea of Not Guilty to the charge. R., pp.
18/218. On the 18 th day of July, 2013, the Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress all statements and
evidence obtained as a result of the search and seizure of his person that occurred pursuant to a
traffic stop for a violation of I.C. Section 49-808(2). alleging that the stop and the subsequent
search and seizure were conducted in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. R., pp. 24/218.
After subsequent hearings on the Motion to Suppress, the Honorable Judge Timothy Hansen of the
District Court ofldaho for the Fourth Judicial District denied the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
R., pp. 156-166/218. On or about June 4tti, 2014, Appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty
reserving his right to appeal the District Court's decision on the Motion to Suppress Evidence.
R., pp. 178/218 and pp. 174/218. Appellant now submits for the Court's consideration this Brief on
Appeal.
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C. Statement of the Facts
The facts as found by the Honorable Judge Hansen in his Memorandum Decision and Order dated
December 18 th , 2013 were as follows (R., pp. 156-158):
On April 19, 2013, at approximately 12:20 a.m., Idaho State Police Trooper Blake
Higley initiated a traffic stop of a green Honda Civic on Interstate 84 in Ada County, Idaho.
for failure to signal a lane change for a minimum of five seconds as required under I.C. §
49-808(2). Prior to the stop, the Idaho State Police received information from the Oregon
State Police that the vehicle had been stopped in Oregon earlier that night. The information
from the Oregon State Police indicated that the encounter had aroused suspicion, but as no
K-9 unit was available and the driver did not consent to a search of the vehicle, the driver
was allowed to continue on his way. This information from the Oregon State Police had
been communicated to Trooper Higley and other Idaho State Police officers. When
Trooper Higley stopped the vehicle, the driver, Defendant Thomas Kelley, produced a
New Hampshire driver's license. Defendant indicated the vehicle belonged to a friend and
produced registration that showed the vehicle was registered in California. Defendant was
unable to provide proof of insurance. Trooper Higley observed a dog in the vehicle, as well
as a few backpacks, a pair of skis, and some dog items. The passenger side of the back seat
had been folded down to accommodate the skis, and Trooper Higley could see into pmi of
the trunk area.
Defendant indicated he was coming from the Tahoe area and heading to Jackson
Hole. He said he planned to stay in Jackson Hole for a short time, return to the Tahoe area,
and then leave Tahoe again to drive to New Hampshire for his summer job. Shortly into the
conversation, Defendant volunteered that he had been stopped in Oregon earlier that night
and that he had been "searched." Defendant indicated that the search took over two hours
total, that it took thirty minutes or the K-9 unit to arrive, and that it took an hour for
Defendant to put everything back into his vehicle after the search.
During the conversation, Trooper Higley observed that Defendant had reddened
conjunctiva and exhibited eyelid tremors. Trooper Higley observed some Zig Zag rolling
papers in the vehicle, which Defendant stated he used for rolling tobacco. Trooper Higley
also observed rolling tobacco in the vehicle. When asked when he had last used marijuana,
Defendant indicated that he did not smoke marijuana but that he had used marijuana about
two years previously, while he was in college. Trooper Higley was concerned that there
were narcotics in the vehicle. Trooper Higley asked for consent to search the vehicle,
which Defendant declined. While Trooper Higley was speaking to Defendant about the
details of his trip and the stop in Oregon, Officer Marshall Plaisted of the Boise City Police
Department mTived on the scene with his drug detection K-9, Turk. Sergeant Jason Cagle,
Trooper Higley's supervisor, had also arrived on the scene to assist. Trooper Higley had
Defendant exit the vehicle along with his dog. While Officer Plaisted was deploying his
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drug detection K-9 around the vehicle, Defendant continued to talk to Trooper Higley
about the search of his vehicle in Oregon earlier that night, reiterating how long the search
took and other details of the search.
Officer Plaisted presented the exterior of Defendant's vehicle to his K-9 in a
counterclockwise manner. The K-9 alerted at the driver's side door, where the window had
been rolled down. Officer Plaisted continued to present the exterior of the vehicle, and the
K-9 alerted at the passenger's side door, where the window had also been rolled down.
Officer Plaisted then placed the K-9 inside the vehicle from the driver's side door. The K-9
immediately jumped into the back seat, where there was a large bag of dog food. The K-9
attempted to sniff around the bag and put his nose underneath it, so Officer Plaisted
removed the bag of dog food from the vehicle. The K- 9 continued to alert in that area,
attempting to put his nose in between the seat back crevice and also around the seat cushion
at the floor board area in the rear of the vehicle.
After the K-9 was placed inside the vehicle, Trooper Higley and Sergeant Cagle
began to search the vehicle. Sergeant Cagle focused his search on the trunk area of the
vehicle. Three vacuum-sealed containers of marijuana were found in the vehicle, two of
which were located in the trunk area. The third was packaged separately in a Tupperware
container.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR WHEN IT FOUND THAT TROOPER
HIGLEY HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO EXTEND THE DURATION
OF THE STOP?

II. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR WHEN IT FOUND THAT TROOPER
HIGLEY DID NOT ABANDON THE PURPOSE OF THE STOP WITHOUT
REASONABLE SUSPICION?
III. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR WHEN IT FOUND THE OFFICERS HAD
PROBALE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE PRIOR TO THE SEARCH OF
THE VEHICLE?
IV. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE WAS
SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE TRUNK AREA OF THE
VEHICLE WITHOUT A WARRANT?
V. DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR WHEN IT FOUND THAT I.C. § 49-808(2) IS
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VOID FOR VAGUENESS AS APPLIED TO
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE?
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I.

ARGUMENT
Trooper Higley did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the stop beyond

the original purpose of the stop.
A. Introduction.
The defendant/ Appellant was pulled over while traveling on Highway I-84, for failing to
use a signal for a full five seconds before changing lanes, in violation of LC. § 49-808(2).

Transcript, p. 141, line 11-15. Prior to pulling the vehicle over, he followed it for over 15 miles
because he had received information from Oregon Police that he had been stopped by them but
they did not have a drug dog on scene to search him, and they found his behavior suspicious.

Transcript, at p. 138-140. Trooper Higley did not have any more specific information than this.
See Id.
The Honorable Judge Hansen found in his opinion that, "based upon the totality of
the circumstances, Trooper Higley had reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the
traffic stop. At the hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress, Trooper Higley testified that
he found Defendant's stated travel plans "confusing," and that what Defendant was telling
Trooper Higley about his plans did not make sense. In particular, Trooper Higley noted the
quick duration of the trip, the back and forth travel that was involved, and Defendant's
route through Oregon and Idaho, which did not appear to be a direct route for one traveling
from Tahoe to Jackson Hole. Trooper Higley testified that he is familiar with the problem
of drug trafficking along the I-84 corridor through Oregon and Idaho and, through Drug
Interdiction Training, he is trained to look for indicators of such drug trafficking. Trooper
Higley noted that Defendant had very few items in the vehicle, and that the vehicle
belonged to someone else. Trooper Higley testified that based on his training and
experience, a driver who is making a quick trip in a third-party vehicle, carrying minimal
luggage, arouses suspicion .... " R., pp. 162/218, lines 15-25.

He then goes on to cite additional observations made by Trooper Higley during the course
of the encounter with the Appellant. The Appellant agrees that these were all observations which
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are supported by substantial evidence in the record, but what are crucially lacking are
information/findings with regard to the timing of the observations and when this encounter turned
from one where the officer is investigating someone for an improper lane change into a detention
for a drug investigation. Addressed below will be the Appellant's contention that this stop was
improperly prolonged beyond the original purpose of the stop, and that the Trooper in this case did
not have reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. Many of the observations alluded to by Judge
Hansen were gathered during the course of the investigation, as many observations and findings
can be when given time and ability to actually conduct an investigation; The question is when such
an investigation is allowable and when is it conducted simply because the officer desires to, and
not based upon the observations of an officer that lead him down that path during a routine traffic
stop.
The Appellant contends that, in this case, the Trooper had an agenda to stop the vehicle,
based upon information he had received from Oregon that the vehicle was "suspicious". He
therefore did what he needed to in order to extend the stop from one of a pretextual traffic violation
into one of a drug investigation, based upon information that would constitute a mere "hunch" but
not actual reasonable suspicion. The Appellant also acknowledges the standard of review with
regard to factual findings on appeal, (below), but suggests that some findings with regard to what
observations were made and when, leading to further investigation, are lacking.

B. Standard of review.
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, the court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by
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substantial evidence, but [will] freely review the application of constitutional principles to the
facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 56L 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez~Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993. 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659,662 (Ct.App.1999). State v. Clink, Not Reported in P.3d, 2011 WL 11048191 (Idaho
App.2011.).
C. Argument.

The findings of the Honorable Judge Hansen in the Decision and Order appear to be that
the following observations constituted reasonable suspicion to extend the purpose of the stop
beyond one for a traffic violation: "The Court concludes that based upon Trooper Higley's training
and experience with indicators of drug trafficking along the I-84 corridor and indicators as to
recent marijuana use, as well as the inferences which can reasonably be drawn from Trooper
Higley's observations of Defendant and the information provided by Defendant regarding his trip
and his encounter with the Oregon State Police, Trooper Higley had reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity was occurring. Accordingly, under the totality of the circumstances, the extension
of the traffic stop to investigate possible narcotics activity and allow for the K-9 search was
justified." Citing State v. Danney, 153 Idaho at 409,283 P.3d at 726. R., pp. 163/218, lines 19-26.
However, many of these observations took place after the purpose of the stop had already been
extended/abandoned. For example, the conversation about the Oregon stop, took place "later on in
the conversation" according to Trooper Higley, and upon observation of the video of the stop

6

which was admitted into evidence for the court's review, qfier the purpose of the stop had already
been extended. Transcript, pp. 177-188. As to the eyelid tremors, those were not observed by the
officer until after he had the defendant step out of the vehicle and at some point, conducted an eye
exam on him. Transcript, pp. 144, lines 16-25, pp. 145, lines 1-25, pp. 146, lines 1-13. (Trooper
Higley states the eye observations occurred after they had been talking "at length".)
However, the Decision and Order does not address the timing of any of the events, whether
they were initial observations which merely led to the extension of the stop or actually occurred
after the purpose of the stop had been abandoned and the stop had been extended. The video in this
case of the events was admitted so that the District Court Judge Hansen could review it and make
his own observations as to the timing of the events, and the parties stipulated to his review of the
video for that purpose, rather than playing it in court (See Transcript p. 109, lines 20-24.). but
those findings are lacking in the Decision and Order. Therefore, it is the position that, when the
timing of the observations is taken into account, the Trooper did not have reasonable suspicion to
extend the purpose of the stop.
In reviewing the audio from the dash cam, it would appear the Defendant was consistently
and appropriately responding to a series of questions from the officer. The officer notes that he was
suspicious of the time frame Kelley had given him and he noticed Kelley had reddened conjunctiva
and exhibited eyelid tremors. The officer questioned Kelley about recent drug use and Kelley
denied use of marijuana in two years. (See id.) The officer apparently at that point searched the
glove box and found rolling zig zag papers, which Kelley stated were for tobacco use only. When
asked for permission to search the vehicle, Kelley declined.
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At this point the officer requests Kelley to step out of the vehicle and moved him to the
shoulder of the roadway, and he continues to question him and to discuss his plans for travel. The
officer noted his travel plans did not make sense, as he was traveling from Tahoe to Jackson Hole
to visit friends only to return to Tahoe, and then depart again. He also found it odd that Kelley
spent two hours with law enforcement but could not say which agency it was that stopped him. At
some point Officer Plaisted arrives on scene with a drug canine, and he observed as Officer
Plaisted opened the driver's door and began searching the interior.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that an investigative detention "must be temporary and
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 500 (1983). While officers may ask unrelated questions from the purpose of the stop itself: on
topics such as drugs and weapons, the proper analysis is whether the police action increased the
scope of the detention beyond a routine traffic stop. See Id. In State v. Gutierrez, the occupants of
a vehicle were questioned about drugs and alcohol for between 60 to 90 seconds after receiving a
warning for speeding. 137 Idaho 647, 652 (Ct. App. 2002). The Idaho Court of Appeals held that
the officer's interrogation of the driver was unlawful because it was entirely unrelated to the
purpose of the stop and unreasonably lengthened the detention after the purpose of the stop was
accomplished. Id. at 653. The case at hand is analogous to Gutierrez in the sense that the duration
of the investigatory stop was extended after the purpose of the stop was effectuated, and without
sufficient reasonable suspicion to extend the purpose of the stop.
In this case, the Appellant does not contend that Trooper Higley's questions regarding
whether there were drugs in the vehicle or where he was going were improper. However, the
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Appellant contends that nothing suspicious occurred until after he is further questioned, observed,
and asked to step out of the vehicle. This is where all observations Trooper Higley made about
lying regarding the stop in Oregon, observing eyelid tremors, and confusing plans, occurred. By
the time the Trooper asks him to step out of the vehicle, the original purpose of the stop had been
abandoned, and the questioning which continues unreasonably lengthened the purpose of the stop.
While Courts have held that strong odors in vehicles, combined with inconsistency in
occupants' stories, can justify reasonable suspicion to extend a stop to obtain a drug dog, we do not
have those factors here, or even a combination of factors that would rise to the level of reasonable
suspicion. (See State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 42 P. 3d 706). (See Transcript, pp. 143, lines
18-21, where Trooper Higley testified there was no smell emanating from the vehicle that he
observed). It is the position of the Defendant that there is an insufficient link between a route as
described here by the defendant, or a detention of an alleged amount of time that the officer finds
questionable, and actual drug activity, and that any link which could be made would fall into the
category of "circumstances that describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers,
who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude that as little
foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure". See Reid v Georgia, 448 U.S.438, 100
S. Ct. 2752 (1980). In that case, the Petitioner arrived at the Atlanta airport on a commercial airline
flight in the early morning hours of August 14, 1978. The Petitioner was observed by an agent of
the DEA, who was in the airport for the purpose of uncovering illicit commerce. See Id, at 439.
Separated by the Petitioner was another man, who carried a shoulder bag like the one the Petitioner
cmTied. As they proceeded through the concourse past the baggage claim area, the Petitioner
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occasionally looked back in the direction of the second man. See Id. When they reached the main
lobby of the terminal, the second man caught up with the petitioner and spoke briefly with him. See
Id. When the Agent approached them and identified himself, he spoke to them and observed them

to be nervous and indicated he would be in Fort Lauderdale only one day. See Id. When the Agent
asked the men to accompany him, he began to run. See Id. The Court in that case stated that, "The
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition of searches and seizures that are not supported by
some objective justification governs all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only
a brief detention short of traditional arrest." See Id. citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S., 72 L 89 S.
Ct. 1394, 22 1. Ed. 2d 676 (] 969); et al. In that case, the court found that, "the appellate court's
conclusion that the DEA agent reasonably suspected the petitioner of wrongdoing rested on the
fact that the petitioner appeared to fit the so-called 'drug-courier profile,' a somewhat informal
compilation of characteristics believed to be typical of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics." See
Id"

Specifically, the court thought it relevant that (1) the petitioner had arrived from Fort
Lauderdale, which the agent testified is a principle place of origin of cocaine sold elsewhere in the
country, (2) the petitioner arrived in the early morning, when law enforcement activity is
diminished and (3) he and his companion appeared to be trying to conceal the fact they were
traveling together, and (4) they apparently had no luggage other than their shoulder bags." Id, at
441. This is straight down the line analogous to the relevant observations of the officer in this case
that occurred initially. As noted by the District court Judge in this case, the officer testified he is
familiar with the problem of drug trafficking along I-84, and observations he is trained to look for
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occurred in this case, such as traveling with very little luggage and "confusing" travel plans, that
did not appear to be a direct route, driving a third party vehicle. See R., pp. 162/218, lines 15-25. In
Reid, the Court held that this information was insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion, and

instead fell in the category of an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch', and the
circumstances would describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would
be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude that as little foundation as there
was in this case could constitute a seizure. Id. Likewise, were the court in this case to hold that
confusing travel plans with little luggage traveling along I-84 were enough to constitute reasonable
suspicion for drug activity, this profiling hunch would make many innocent travelers subject to
virtually random searches for traveling along I-84.

If, therefore, this is insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion, and the Appellant was
detained on the basis of these observations alone, then State v. Gutierrez, at 137 Idaho 647, 51 P.
3d 461 (2002), would require that any continuation of the detention which occurred, which
resulted in further questioning of the defendant/ Appellant, after the reason for the traffic stop had
been fulfilled, would be in violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Id, at 465, 651. In that case, the defendant Gutierrez was a passenger in a vehicle
pulled over for speeding. Officers asked the driver for his driver's license and registration, which
he produced. The officer thought he exhibited undue nervousness during this exchange. S'ee Id. It
took the officer approximately five minutes to complete the driver's checks, which revealed no
problems. The officer returned to the vehicle and, prior to delivering the warning or handing back
the registration, the officer asked the driver to step out of the vehicle. Once he exited his vehicle,
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the officer returned the registration and issued the warning for the stop. He then asked him three
questions unrelated to the stop. The questioning took between sixty to ninety seconds. While
answering those questions, the officers noticed behavior from the passengers he felt was
suspicious. See Id. The officer then obtained consent to search the vehicle. See Id.
The Court noted a long line of cases which held that a detention of driver and/or passengers
of a vehicle was not lawful once the purpose of the stop was resolved. See Id, at 466, 652. Holding
that the detention which occurred after the license was returned was not voluntary, the Court
determined the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the purpose into a drug
investigation. See Id. In this case, the defendant was never informed he was free to leave once the
purpose of the stop was completed. Upon review of the video, the Appellant Kelley is pulled over
at 12:18:47, where the Trooper introduces himself and informs him of the five second rule. The
violation of this rule is never brought up again in conversation. If the Trooper intended this as a
warning, then the purpose of the stop was completed at that point. The only other relevant point to
the stop which is later mentioned is the insurance, where the Trooper asks him if he has current
insurance at 12:22:25. The Defendant's response is unclear, but this issue is not brought up again.
so this must have been abandoned if no ticket was issued for this, or completed at that point.
Therefore, anything which occurred after 12:22:25 would have needed reasonable suspicion to
extend the purpose of the stop, according to Gutierrez. In the Opinion of the Honorable Judge
Hansen, this issue is not addressed, nor is there mention of findings of fact with regard to when the
purpose of the stop was effectuated. See R., pp. 161-165.

It is not until after all mention of the five second rule or insurance has concluded, on review
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of the video, that the Trooper asks the defendant about the rolling papers, and asks him to tilt his
head to observe eye tremors, at 12:23:02. At 12:23: he requests to search the vehicle, at which
point Mr. Kelley declines. After this, at 12 :23 :48, he asks him more about his travel plans after
Jackson. WY, and then he requests that he step out of the vehicle, and at 12:25:44, they discuss the
stop in Oregon, which the Trooper testified was the "biggest red flag" in his view, because he
knew he was lying at that point. See Transcript, page 129, lines 22-25. But, as noted above, by this
time, the purpose of the stop had already been abandoned.
D. Conclusion.
The eye tremors and conjunctiva, the confusing travel plans with little luggage to coincide,
and stories about being stopped in Oregon, are all considered as what formed the basis of the
reasonable suspicion itself, however, according to the Decision and Order by the District Court
Judge Hansen. R., pp. 162/218, lines 15-25. The only part of the story which was addressed prior
to the extension of the stop was when the Appellant informs the Trooper of his plans to travel to
Jackson Hole, WY from Tahoe. None of the other details of the trip, including how long he had
been in Tahoe, were raised until after all mention of insurance and/or the five second rule had
ended. Therefore, none of those details, although they may have seemed suspicious to the Trooper
at the time, can justify the extension of the stop. Just as in Gutierrez, where the court stated the
questions about alcohol, drugs and weapons "could not be justified as part of the traffic stop," (Id.
at 466, 652) they were not justified as a part of the stop in this case. It was therefore error for the
District Court Judge to hold that all of these observations justified the extension of the stop, having
occurred afier the purpose of the stop had been concluded.
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II.

Trooper Higley abandoned the original purpose of the stop without

reasonable suspicion to conduct a drug investigation.
A. Introduction.
As noted above, the District Court simply did not address the time frame as to when the
purpose of the stop itself had been effectuated. The fact that the five second rule was never
addressed after the introduction by the Trooper as the reason for the stop is likewise not addressed
in the Memorandum Decision and Order in the record. If the court were not to decide that this
purpose had been concluded prior to the continuation of the questioning and observations by the
Trooper, then certainly the purpose of the stop was completely abandoned prior to this point.
Therefore, in the alternative, the Appellant argues that the purpose of the stop had been abandoned,
as it is never again mentioned or addressed.

B. Standard (?/Review.
The standard of review on a motion to suppress involves a mixed question of law and fact.
The standard on review on a motion to suppress is bifurcated. The court will accept the trial court's
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely review the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Griggs, 149 Idaho 361, 23 3 Idaho P. 3d 1283
(2010).

C Argument.
In State v. Aguirre, at 141 Idaho 560, 112 p. 3d 848 (2005), the driver, defendant Aguirre,
was pulled over after a deputy noticed his vehicle "circling" a scene and recognized the diver as
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one with prior contacts who was a convicted felon. See Id, at 562, 850. The deputy decided to
follow the vehicle, and when he eventually left the parking lot but did not come to a complete stop
prior to entering the roadway, the deputy decided to pull him over for this violation. See Id, at 562,
850. After following him another few miles, a different officer conducted the stop. See Id, at 562,
850. This officer asked him why he was circling the area, and asked for license information and
insurance. See Id, at 562, 850. After receiving these documents, the deputy asked whether he had
anything illegal in the vehicle, and he answered he did not. See Id, at 562, 850. He asked for
permission to search the vehicle, at which point he declined. See Id, at 562, 850.
These facts are directly analogous to the facts in this case in that: ( 1) The Deputy in Aquirre
and the Trooper in this case both had a preconceived idea that they wanted to pull over the driver,
due to previous contacts/ information received that did not amount to reasonable suspicion, and
decided to do so when a traffic violation of some kind was committed; (2) Once the initial contact
is made, no further questioning of any kind ensued regarding the original purpose of the stop, i.e,
said traffic violation; (3) The officer immediately began questioning with regard to drugs or illegal
substances and switched to a drug investigation.
The court in Aguirre stated, "The question whether an investigative detention is reasonable
requires a dual inquiry into (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and (2)
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the detention in the
first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21, 88 S. Ct. at 1879-80, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905-06; Parkinson, 135
Idaho at 361, 17 P. 3d at 305. That is not to say that the purpose of the stop is fixed at the time the
stop is initiated. As this Court has noted, a routine traffic stop might tum up suspicious
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circumstances that justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop. Parkinson, 135 Idaho
at 362, 17 p. 3d at 306. Nothing in the record in the instant matter suggests such circumstances
arose after this stop was initiated .... Where a person is detained, the scope of detention must be
carefully tailored to its underlying justification.'' Id, Citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500,
103, S. Ct. 1319, 1325-26, 75 L. ed.2d 229,238 (1983); Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 361, 17 P. 3d at
305.
The court went on to distinguish the situation in Aguirre from other instances where police
had not yet completed the purpose of the stop while running a drug dog around the vehicle, and
cases where one officer writes a ticket for the underlying purpose of the stop (traffic violation)
while another asks unrelated questions. See Id, at 564, 852. It concluded that, because in that case,
no further effort was made to pursue the initial purpose of the stop, and the collective effort of all
officers was '·uniformly directed at a drug investigation completely unrelated to the stop. The
purpose that justified the stop-- the issuance of a traffic citation-- was immediately abandoned.
Aguirre did eventually receive a traffic citation, but not until after he had been mTested and
transported to jail on the weapons offense. In light of all these facts, we conclude that the use of a
drug dog impermissibly extended the duration of the detention authorized by Terry." Id.
In this case, the District Court Judge Hansen makes no findings of fact in the Memorandum
Decision and Order with regard to the pursuit of the initial purpose of the stop. There is no mention
in the findings as to the traffic offense beyond what is stated as the reason justifying the stop. R.,
pp. 162/218, lines 15-25. Therefore, the Appellant asks this court to take notice of the record
(video recording of stop, admitted into evidence) as providing substantial evidence that the
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purpose of the stop was not mentioned again after the stop itself, and that the last mention of
insurance took place prior to the continued questioning regarding his trip, test for eye tremors, and
discussion regarding his prior stop as noted above.
While questions unrelated to the stop itself are justified, the defendant's responses to those
initial questions were only related to where he was going and where he was coming from.
D. Conclusion.
This case is analogous to Aguirre because the officers immediately abandoned the initial
purpose of the stop, which was to investigate a violation of the five second rule. While questions
unrelated to the stop itself are justified, the defendant's responses to those initial questions were
only related to where he was going and where he was coming from. As noted, his initial responses
regarding traveling to Wyoming from Tahoe did not constitute reasonable suspicion. Even if this
route was deemed lengthy by the officer, it is in isolation. There are no observations from the
officer regarding the defendant's behavior that was deemed suspicious or any other combination of
factors that may add up under a totality of circumstances to reasonable suspicion that occurred
prior to the extension of the stop and/or abandonment of the initial purpose of the stop. As such,
the findings that resulted from the search of the trunk that subsequently ensued, including
marijuana, ought to have been suppressed.

III.

There was insufficient probable cause to support a search of the trunk area of

the Appellant's vehicle when the search of the trunk occurred.
A. Introduction.
With regard to the search of the trunk area in this case, the Honorable District Court Judge
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Hansen made the following findings of fact in his Memorandum Decision and Order:
"Officer Plaisted testified that his K-9, Turk, is a certified, single-purpose drug
detection dog. Turk is certified to detect the odors of narcotics - specifically, the odors of
marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine. Officer Plaisted testified in detail
regarding the behaviors Turk exhibits when alerting on an odor of narcotics and described
his observation of those behaviors during Turk's sniff of the exterior of the vehicle. After
Turk alerted at the driver's side door and passenger's side door of the exterior of the vehicle,
Officer Plaisted placed Turk inside the vehicle. Trooper Higley testified that when a K-9
officer places his K-9 inside the vehicle after conducting the exterior sniff, this is a signal
that the dog has alerted on the outside of the vehicle.· Trooper Higley can also be heard on
his audio explaining this to Defendant. See State's Exhibit 1 at 00:27:43-53. The fact that
Turk was placed inside the vehicle communicated to Trooper Higley that he and Sergeant
Cagle could begin searching the vehicle." R., p. 164, lines 21-26, p. 165, lines 1-5.
The Appellant does not contest the finding of the above facts on this appeal. The finding by
the District Court Judge that the Officer who searched the trunk of the Appellant's vehicle (Officer
Cagle) did so as the drug dog alerted on the vehicle, as soon as the dog was placed in the car is
supported in the record. Officer Cagle did not testify as to when he searched the trunk area, as he
did not testify at any of the suppression hearings in this case. Trooper Higley testified that as soon
as Officer Plaisted, the canine officer, placed his dog in the vehicle, Officer Cagle walked up and
started searching the trunk because he would have understood that to demonstrate a positive alert.

See Transcript, pp. 154-155. The Appellant argues that the Judge committed legal error by finding
that any positive alert on a vehicle automatically translates to probable cause to search a trunk area.
The Honorable Judge Hansen apparently did not apply the correct constitutional standard to the
legal analysis as to when a search of a trunk area is authorized; a matter to which this Court
exercises free review. See State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595, 38 P. 3d 633 (2001). The appellant
contends that there must be probable cause to search the trunk area itself to pass constitutional
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Fourth Amendment standards.
B. Argument.

The Fourth Amendment requires that all searches and seizures be reasonable. State v.
Murphy. 129 Idaho 861,863,934 P.2d 34, 36 (Ct.App.1997). Warrantless searches and seizures

are considered unreasonable per se unless they come within one of the few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. Cali[ornia v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565.
580, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991, 114 L.Ed.2d 619. 634 (1991); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 454-55. 91 S.Ct. 2022. 2031-32, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 575-76 (1971); State v. Henderson, 114
Idaho 293, 295, 756 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1988); State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 400, 958 P.2d 22,
26 (Ct.App.1998). It is undisputed that the officers in this case did not have a warrant prior to their
search of the Appellant's trunk. One exception to the warrant requirement is the "automobile
exception" under which law enforcement officers may search an automobile and the containers
within it if there is probable cause to believe that the automobile holds contraband or evidence of a
crime. State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894. 898, 821 P.2d 949, 953 (1991); State v. Ramirez, 121
Idaho 319. 323,824 P.2d 894,898 (Ct.App.1991). The automobile exception is based both upon
the automobile's ready mobility, an exigency sufficient to excuse the warrant requirement where
there is probable cause for a search and upon the lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile as
compared to the privacy interest in a home. State v. Braendle, 134 Idaho 173, 175, 997 P.2d 634.
636 (Ct.App.2000). The permissible scope of a warrantless automobile search "is defined by the
object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe it will be found."
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,824, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2172, 72 L.Ed.2d 572. 593 (1982),
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quoted in Braendle, 134 Idaho at 175. 997 P .2d at 636. See State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595, 38
P. 3d 633 (2001).
The District Court Judge did not find there was probable cause of contraband in this case
specific to the trunk area. Judge Hansen did not make any legal determination whether probable
cause to search a trunk was specifically required or whether probable cause to search any area of
the vehicle based upon an alert of a drug dog was sufficient; He simply determined that, based
upon a "totality of the circumstances" in this case, officers had probable cause to search the trunk.
The Appellant thus asks this court to find the District Court Judge did not apply the correct legal
standard to when probable cause to search a trunk is sufficient. R., p. 165, lines 20-23.
The Appellant contends the following with regard to the search of the trunk area: The
existence of probable cause to search the interior of a vehicle is not necessarily sufficient to justify
a search of the car's trunk. See State v. Schmakeda, 136 Idaho 595, 38 P. 3d 633 (2001). There
must be specific, articulable facts supporting probable cause to believe that the contraband or
evidence is, in fact, concealed in the trunk. See id, citing Wimberly v. Superior court, 16 Cal. 3d
557. 128 Cal. Rptr. 641, 547 P. 2d 417, 424-427 (1976). In this case, it is the position of the
defendant that there is an insufficient indication that the officers in this case had any specific
probable cause pursuant to the trunk area that would have justified a search of the entire vehicle.
Reports from both officers indicate only that the dog was hitting upon the main body of the
vehicle, and that it was a different officer entirely who searched the trunk area.
Probable cause to search the entirety of a vehicle does not automatically exist throughout a
vehicle simply because it exits for a certain part of a vehicle. Whether probable cause exists to
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search a trunk of a vehicle is actually contingent upon what the probable cause leads the officer to
believe as far as the illegal activity, and the logical extension as to in particular where evidence of
it may be found. See Wilson v. State. 174 Md. App. 434, 921 A. 2d 881 (Md. App. 2007). As
explained in the case involving probable cause to search particular containers within an
automobile, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,824, 102 S. Ct. 2157,2172,72 L.Ed. 2d 572
( 1982), "probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband
or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab." However, if the probable cause extended to
the entirety of the vehicle, then the containers therein would be included in the search. Id.
In a case where the state also argued that a drug dog hitting upon the passenger side of a
vehicle automatically gave the officer probable cause to search the entire vehicle, the court stated,
"[w]e think that overstates the matter. Because probable cause must be tailored to specific
compartments and containers within an automobile, the key is whether the dog "alerted" in the
precise vicinity of the trunk. That is a question of fact that the district court resolved in favor of
finding on the fact that first marijuana was found in the center console, which led to an additional
smell leading to the trunk itself.) See US. v. Carter, 300 F. 3d 415,422 C.A. 4(N.C), 2002.
The law in Idaho is not whether under the "totality of the circumstances" there was
probable cause to search the vehicle when determining whether probable cause extends to the
trunk area. "The existence of probable cause to search the interior of a car is not necessarily
sufficient to justify a search of the car's trunk." State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595, 38 P.3d 633
(2001 ). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the smell of burnt marijuana was not
sufficient to search the trunk of a vehicle as well. See Id. The reason is because burnt marijuana
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only leads to probable
cause to believe use of drug activity may be present, not trafficking in drug activity (consistently
with a long line of other cases in other jurisdictions.) Id, at 1226. Since the smell of raw marijuana
could indicate trafficking activity may be present, the probable cause would extend to the search of
the entire vehicle.
The District Court Judge in this case addressed the holding in Schmadeka and
distinguished it because, in that case, the court held that the smell of burnt marijuana was not
enough to lead to probable cause to search a trunk, as opposed to the smell of raw marijuana, which
would not be, stating that Schmadeka did not apply because in this case, there was no smell of
marijuana that factored into the probable cause determination. See R., p. 165.

The Judge

misstates the holding, which was not limited to the type of smell (if any) as the determining factor
with regard to probable cause. Rather, the court was holding that the trial court must look to what
the evidence leads· to logically, to determine whether it creates probable cause to search a trunk or
other area. Logically, burnt marijuana leads to a determination of use, which would not lead to
evidence in a trunk; whereas, a raw smell leads to a determination of raw marijuana, which is
frequently carried in trunk areas or other compartments in a vehicle. Id. The point of the holding
that the Judge needed to apply was that one cannot deduce that probable cause to search one part of
a vehicle automatically leads to probable cause to search another. Therefore, an analysis as to what
the drug dog alert meant on one part of a vehicle needed to be assessed to determine if this granted
probable cause to search the trunk area.
The court in that case clarified,

22

The existence of probable cause to search the interior of a car is not
necessarily sufficient to justify a search of the car's trunk. In Wimberly v. Superior
Court, 16 Cal.3d 557, 128 Cal.Rptr. 641. 547 P.2d 417, 424-427 (1976), the
California Supreme Court explained that observations that support only the
inference of casual drug usage, the odor of burnt marijuana in the passenger
compartment, do not reasonably support the inference**638 *600 that there is
additional contraband hidden in the trunk. Id. at 427. Rather, there must be specific
articulable facts supporting probable cause to believe that the contraband or
evidence is, in fact, concealed in the trunk. Id. at 428. See also United States v.
Downs, 151 F.3d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir.1998) (where the smell of burnt marijuana
prompts a search of the passenger portion of the vehicle and no controlled
substances are found in that area, there is no probable cause to search further in the
vehicle's trunk); United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir.2000) (the mere
odor of burnt methamphetamine in the passenger compartment of a vehicle does
not provide probable cause to search the vehicle's trunk); Burkett v. State, 271 Ark.
150,607 S.W.2d 399 (1980) (roach clip and marijuana cigarette butt in the ashtray
does not extend the scope of probable cause to the trunk); compare State v. Longo,
608 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa 2000) (not determining whether the smell of burnt
marijuana alone is sufficient to justify a search of both the passenger area and trunk
of a motor vehicle, and holding that other suspicious factors such as the
inconsistent stories told by the suspects and the passenger's suspicious demeanor
raised the level of suspicion sufficiently high to constitute probable cause for a
search of the entire vehicle, including the trunk area in which marijuana and
methamphetarnine were found). S'tate v. Schmakeda, 136 Idaho 595, 38 P. 3d 633
(2001 ).

In this case, the officer did not have facts that would lead to a belief the defendant was
trafficking in marijuana. He had some indicators that may be associated with drug use, such as
reddened conjunctiva and eyelid tremors. The drug dog did not alert on the trunk of the vehicle,
and in fact, when Officer Cagle searched the trunk area, he did so simultaneously with the canine
handler placing the dog in the vehicle, because he knew that to be an alert of some kind. See
Transcript, p. 155, line 1-5. This is not specific enough to lead to probable cause to believe
trafficking was taking place. There was nothing to indicate that there was a particular smell
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emanating from the trunk area; in fact, there was evidence to the contrary in the record. The
Officer of the canine unit walked all the way around the vehicle, including by the trunk area, and
the drug dog never alerted. Under a totality of the circumstances approach, a reasonable person
would not therefore believe any drugs existed in the trunk compartment.
IV.
I. C. § 49-808(2) is void for vagueness as applied to this case because the
statutory terms have not been clearly defined so that average individuals would understand
what conduct is prohibited by the statute; in addition, the lack of sufficient clarity in the
wording of the aforementioned statute invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

A. Introduction.

In this case, the defendant was pulled over for violating LC.§ 49-808(2), which states, "A
signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall be given continuously to warn
other traffic. On controlled-access highways and before turning from a parked position, the signal
shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other instances, for not less
than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning." In this case, the
Appellant contends that the highway he was pulled over on, I-84, qualifies under the definitions
provided by statute as both a "controlled access highway" and as a '"through highway'' pursuant to
Idaho Code definitions and pursuant to testimony at the hearing by David Szplett, an expert from
the Idaho Department of Transportation who testified at the suppression hearing in this case. See
l.C. § 49-109(5)(b) and I.C.§ 49-109(5)( c)., and Transcript, p. 26, lines 1-23. The expert did not
know the legal definition of a through highway as provided by statute, but acknowledged that,
when presented with that definition, I-84 would qualify. See Id. Therefore, since the above statute
clearly states that, for "controlled access highways" the traffic signal shall be given for not less
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than five seconds, but it "all other instances," not less than the last 100 feet traveled, and other
types of highways would necessarily be "all other instances", the statute does not give a person of
ordinary intelligence what it expected of him pursuant to the statute (much less a person from
IDOT). Therefore, it is void for vagueness as applied and the Appellant therefore asks the court to
find there was not reasonable suspicion for the stop.
B. Standard o,f Review.

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, over which this Court exercises de
novo review. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195. 197. 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998).
C. Argument

The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This doctrine requires that a statute
defining criminal conduct be worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is prohibited and that the statute be worded in a manner that does not
allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Village oj'Hqffrnan Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 490 (1982). It is a basic principle of due process that a statute is void

for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City qfRoc¾ford, 408 U.S. 104,
110 (1972). Vague laws offend several important values. First, "because we assume that man is
free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly."
Id. at 108. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). Second, laws must provide explicit standards for those
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who apply them in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Grayned, 408 U.S.
at 108.
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to police officers, judges, and
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application. Id. at 109. Furthermore, due process requires that all "be informed as to
what the State commands or forbids" and that "men of common intelligence'' not be forced to
guess at the meaning of the criminal law. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197 (1998). Thus, "a
statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary
intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes, or if it fails to establish minimal guidelines to
govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute.'· State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706,
712 (2003).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 124 (Ct. App. 1999). A traffic stop, which
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, must be supported by reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws or that either the
vehicle or occupant is subject to detention in connection with a violation of other laws. United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981 ). It is the position of the defendant that LC. §48-808(2)

does not provide adequate notice as to the conduct which is proscribed.
LC. §48-808(2) states, "A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required
shall be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlled-access highways and before
turning from a parked position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5)
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seconds and, in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the
vehicle before turning". The term "controlled access highways" is defined in LC. § 49-109(5)(b)
as, "Any highway or roadway in respect to which owners or occupants of abutting lands and other
persons having no legal right of access to or from the highway except at such points only or in such
manner as may be determined by the public authority having jurisdiction over the highway." It
should be noted that this section is distinguished from the definitions of arterial and through
highways. It would by definition qualify as a through highway, defined as, "Any highway or
portion of it on which vehicular traffic is given preferential right-of-way, and at the entrances to
which vehicular traffic from intersecting highways is required by law to yield the right-of-way to
vehicles on the through highway ... " I. C. §49-109( 5)( c).
In addition, linguistically. this statute can be interpreted in one of two ways, either dictating
that an individual in one circumstance (driving on controlled-access highways and before turning
from a parked position) must give a continuous signal of turning for not less than 5 seconds; while
in all other circumstances for not less than one hundred feet; Or, dictating that in one circumstance
(driving while on controlled access highways and before turning from a parked position) an
individual must give a continuous signal for five seconds; and in all other circumstances must do
this (signal for five seconds continuously) and for not less than one hundred feet.
In this case, the phrase "in all other instances" is separated by commas. A prepositional
phrase ought to be able to be deleted from a sentence without changing the meaning of the
sentence. In this case, that would not be possible. If we delete the prepositional phrase from the
sentence, it reads, "On controlled access highways and before turning from a parked position, the
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signal shall be given for continuously for not less than five seconds and for not less than the last
100 feet before turning." Clearly, this would set up the impracticality that all vehicles, even those
turning from a parked position must signal for 100 feet prior to turning, regardless of the speed or
length of travel. The legislature may have intended the "and" to signify a connecting sentence. If
that is the case, then the phrase "and, in all other instances, for not less than the last 100 feet
traveled by the vehicle before turning'' is missing a subject and a verb. If we are to presume it is
meant as a phrase modifying "the signal shall be given" then it is correctly proscribing only that in
all other instances a signal shall be given for not less than the last l 00 feet traveled by a vehicle
before turning.
In Burton v. State Department of Transportation, 149 Idaho 746, 240 P. 3d 933 (2010), the
court held that the first subsection of this statute was void for vagueness as applied to the facts in
that case. In that case, Burton challenged I.C.§49-808(1) for failing to give adequate notice that a
signal is required when before one drives into a single lane that stems from the merger of two
lanes. See Id. The court held that, because it was simply not apparent from the language of the
statute whether a signal is required when two lanes blend into one, and persons of ordinary
intelligence could only guess at the statute's directive in that circumstance, that this statute
subsection ( 1) was unconstitutionally vague in that circumstance. Id.
In this case as well, subsection (2) of the statute does not provide adequate notice to
persons of ordinary intelligence whether, when not on a controlled access highway or from a
parked position, a turn signal for five seconds in addition to 100 feet is required. More importantly,
in this case, when presented with the definition of a through highway while under oath, the expert

28

from the Idaho Department of Transportation on the hearing on the motion to suppress in this case,
clearly indicated that I-84 would meet the definition provided in the Idaho Code because vehicles
traveling on it are given preferential right-of-way at the entrances to which other vehicles try to
come onto the highway. See Transcript, p. 26 lines 16-22. Therefore, this subsection is
unconstitutionally vague as well when applied to the facts in this case. This meets the definition
as provided in the Idaho Code. See LC. §49-109(5)(c). If a statute dictates a person has to do one
thing in a certain instance but something else in another, and he cannot properly distinguish
between the two, then this is the very definition of void for vagueness. It has to be clear to a person
of ordinary intelligence what conduct is proscribed by law to be constitutional. Grayned, 408 U.S.
at 108.

D. Conclusion
The Memorandum Decision and Order by District Judge Hansen, however, does not
address whether 1-84 meets the definition of a through highway, but simply states that it clearly
meets the definition of a "controlled access highway.'' R., p. 161, lines 5-8. In State v. Brooks, at
341 P. 3d 1259 9C. App. 2014 ), the court held that the statute clearly requires a certain type of
signal (five seconds) in one type of instant: a controlled-access highway (or turning from a parked
position) and 100 feet or more in all other instances. If Highway I-84 qualifies as a controlled
access highway but also as a through highway, then a person of ordinary intelligence would not be
able to discern which is required of him, and the statute is void for vagueness as applied.
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P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Id 83720-0010

(2J U.S. Mail

D Overnight Courier
D Facsimile Transmission

D Hand Delivery

Ada County Prosecutor
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ldaho 83702

(2J U.S. Mail

D Overnight Courier
D Facsimile Transmission

(2J Hand Deli very

Idaho Supreme Court
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720

OU.S.Mail
D Overnight Courier
D Facsimile Transmission
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Elise Easom
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